Trotter Review
Volume 19
Issue 1 Where is Home? Immigrants of Color in
Massachusetts

Article 6

1-1-2010

Service versus Advocacy? A Comparison of Two
Latino Community-Based Organizations in
Chelsea, Massachusetts
Glenn Jacobs
University of Massachusetts Boston, glenn.jacobs@umb.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.umb.edu/trotter_review
Part of the Community-based Research Commons, and the Urban Studies and Planning
Commons
Recommended Citation
Jacobs, Glenn (2010) "Service versus Advocacy? A Comparison of Two Latino Community-Based Organizations in Chelsea,
Massachusetts," Trotter Review: Vol. 19: Iss. 1, Article 6.
Available at: http://scholarworks.umb.edu/trotter_review/vol19/iss1/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the William Monroe Trotter Institute at ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Trotter Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. For more information, please contact
library.uasc@umb.edu.

T H E

T R O T T E R

R E V I E W

Service versus Advocacy?
A Comparison of Two Latino
Community-Based Organizations
in Chelsea, Massachusetts

Glenn Jacobs

[Photo slugged Villa (‘Take Back the Power’) goes opposite the first
page of this article.]

Take Back the Power

Latino men passing the time in 1974 on Pembroke Street, part of the site where the
Villa Victoria (Victory Village) housing complex was later developed by the Emergency Tenants Council Inc. The legend on the mural says of the patron, or boss, at
right, “and he makes himself rich with our work.” Inquilinos Boricuas en Acción
(Puerto Rican Tenants in Action), commonly known as IBA, provides services to
3,000 residents to ensure community control is maintained. The construction of
Villa Victoria is considered a landmark event in the empowerment of Latinos in
Boston. © 1974 by Carlota Duarte. Reprinted by permission.
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They added a new level, the deputy directors. Now it is like
there are more people up and less people down. It was like a
real pyramid and now it’s kind of backwards….The upper part
has grown and this [pointing to the lower part on the organization chart] has shrunk. The difference that I see is that now
I don’t have time to meet with the executive director anymore.
—Flora Vasquez, Program Director, Centro
Latino (Interview, June 10, 2009)
Any time we’re in doubt on an issue, I tell my organizers, “Go
to the street, ask the community. Why are we sitting around a
table saying, ‘We need to do this, we need to do that’? Have we
checked out the community?”
—Gladys Vega, Executive Director of the Chelsea
Collaborative (Interview, July 28, 2009)
Anyone walking down Chelsea’s main drag, Broadway, would be
struck by its raucous cacophony of sights and sounds, a panoply of foreign
languages spoken by women (many mothers with young children and infants), children, teenagers, and men of a variety of physiognomies and
skin tones; a collage of small specialty shops selling jewelry, clothing, religious statues, CDs, and mobile phones; and restaurants and eateries serving El Salvadoran, Vietnamese, Mexican, and Chinese food; pawnshops,
check-cashing places, bakeries, and coffee shops, with occasional rectangles of negative visual space occupied by the post office and chain drug
and convenience stores. It is a new twist on Mondrian’s polychromatic
painting Broadway Boogie Woogie, vibrating with the sounds of reggaeton,
norteño, salsa, or punta instead of jazz. For almost two decades, I have
been fascinated by this tiny city, which, due to its compactness, induces
its highly heterogeneous population, perennially fed by an inflow of poor
immigrants, to rub shoulders socially and civically. This has produced a
remarkable kind of working-class cosmopolitanism that has, for example,
occasionally been noticed elsewhere and described in social scientific writing on multiethnic neighborhoods in early–twentieth-century Los Angeles and in late- twentieth-century New York (Wild, 2005; Sanjeck, 1998).
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My earlier work on Chelsea is a link to the present. There, I closely
examined the Latino community’s struggle with Boston University over
the privatization of its schools from 1989 to 1995 and its participation in
the formation and enactment of educational policy, resulting in the election of the first Latina/o to public office (see Jacobs, 1993; Jacobs, 1994;
Jacobs, 2002). The study demonstrated how intertwined the realities of social and political citizenship could be. The newly exercised social citizenship achieved by Chelsea’s Latinos provided a basis of legitimacy for the
struggles of a continuing stream of immigrants facing the successors to
the oppressive forces their forebears grappled with. In 2002, I mused that
“one might speculate on how Chelsea’s Latino leadership will evolve and
which stimuli will shape its development,” and concluded that for Latino
political representation to keep in step with its own increasing diversity
and the immigration of other national groups, cosmopolitan organizational building would need to occur in order to secure educational and
other gains (Jacobs, 2002, pp. 44–45). That, indeed, has occurred.
Chelsea’s overall population and its Latino contingent have grown,
and Latinos continue to serve in public office and are employed in local municipal jobs. Chelsea’s Latino organizations, now steered by those
schooled in the earlier struggle, have indeed matured and diversified. The
two foremost Latino community-based organizations (CBOs), Centro Latino and the Chelsea Collaborative, both created in 1988, are the focus of
the research reported on here. Both have impressively developed and undergone organizational transformation, with annual budgets surpassing
one million dollars. Centro Latino, a leading provider of education (ESL,
computer), health (HIV testing, case management, support), and community services (after-school youth, immigration), has just completed a
merger with an established and reputed Cambridge organization, Concilio Hispano, with a similar service roster. The Collaborative is a leading
activist organization comprising seven programs: immigrant and immigrant worker rights, housing rights, the Somali Bantu Shambaro Community, environmental justice, summer youth employment, popular education, and educational rights.
The following analysis utilizes a portion of a total of 30 semistructured interviews of administrators, staff, and members, or fifteen in each,
to compare the two leading CBOs with respect to their organizational
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structures, administrations, and their styles and methods of immigrant
social and political incorporation. I accomplish this by using my interview data as it bears on two different key features and events in each
organization. For Centro Latino I first examine a watershed event that
occurred in 2004 and resulted in an important change in its service roster and in its total organization structure. Then I examine the way that
a work ethic, reflecting this change, has surfaced in its key educational
programs. In the case of the Collaborative, I focus on the way boundaries are drawn and maintained in an organization in which the multivalent roles of member, employee, and citizen run the risk of running into
conflict, possibly jeopardizing the organization yet creating intimacy and
organizational solidarity. Following this, I take a close look at how in one
case the membership in the Collaborative of a community organizer living outside Chelsea and representing an activist organization in Roxbury
has affected the respective mission enactments of both organizations.
Methods
The data reported here comprise semistructured interviews ranging
from one hour to an hour and a half in length each. I employed a digital
voice recorder, with detailed notes taken during the interviews. I also have
kept a field diary containing memoirs of the interviews and observations
of the subjects and events transpiring during periods spent in Chelsea. My
field notes include memos comprising thoughts, ideas, and theoretical
speculations as they have occurred to me. With the exceptions of the two
CBOs’ executive directors and Centro’s director of organizational development, pseudonyms are used throughout.
Centro’s Trial by Fire
The following close-up look at a point in Centro’s history details a
decision in 2004 that might have resulted in disaster and ruin but turned
out to be a salubrious one, leaving the organization stronger. It comprises
the ingredients of a fateful decision of Centro executives to sacrifice a
program that delivered one-fourth of the agency’s funding and to change
the organizational profile and program roster into a more effective and
streamlined one. Here the agency’s story is that of its navigation through
the shoals of inadequate funds, the culling of programs, and the risks of
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organizational development and transformation. This streamlining, resulting in a layered organizational structure, while effective, was debatably one that also created an administrative stratum some think actually did not produce efficiency but buffers and inhibits communication
between the executive and lower-level personnel. This account of events
and issues surrounding that fateful climax was given to the author by
Centro executives Juan Vega and Monique Puig-Antich in a joint interview on December 4, 2008. Quoted material from that interview will be
attributed to them by name.
Centro’s planning and creation in 1988 occurred at the hands of local
foundations and progressive state representatives and planners who had
initially produced a feasibility study resulting in a five-year plan for the
development of four other Latino community-based agencies in Chelsea,
including the Collaborative. Centro Latino (originally called Centro Hispano, a name kept for seven years) was incorporated in 1989. During its
first year, it “began in a back room of the Chelsea Human Services Collaborative [now the Chelsea Collaborative], and then moved to an office
suite” (Juan Vega).
In 1998, when Juan Vega came on board, the agency had been running deficits for several years. A new finance director and deputy director
of programs were needed, and programs needed to be eliminated. By the
time of Juan Vega’s arrival, things seemed chaotic. As he put it, “People
were passing through. You could feel the impact of foundations ready to
fund [but] the agency was spread very thin,” meaning that Centro had
accumulated “a lot of tiny little programs: domestic violence, family emergency assistance, etc.” Many would eventually be jettisoned because of the
excessive effort and too little funding to maintain them. (Juan Vega). As
a result, in 1999–2000 “the dominoes started to topple and people began
to leave: it was just about changing the culture of the organization. We
hadn’t yet thinned out our priorities; it was just about reinventing and
professionalizing services….” (Juan Vega) Changing the culture meant, for
example, that as Vega put it, you didn’t have to be poor to have integrity
in serving the community. Something had to be done both to stabilize
the agency and to make it economically more viable. The agency had to
become more financially viable. Thus, “2002–2003 was a time of transition, and of weeding out, streamlining and assessment. What does the
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community need and what do we do best? [We had to] to tell staff and
clients that we can’t do certain programs anymore,” largely due to chronically inadequate funding. (Monique Puig-Antich)
The deputy program director, chief financial officer, and Vega conferred and the shock came when it was decided to sacrifice a big Department of Public Health contract—AIDS Prevention Education—that
brought in $250,000 a year “that dictated what we did every year, and
whatever else we did we had to consider its impact on this program….The
big one was the one that had to go.” (Juan Vega) “It had a lot of staff and a
separate site across the street….It paid for everything; it was one quarter
of the agency’s revenue (we were at the one million dollar mark). It was
the time Bush was coming in and we knew that the tide against it was
coming in, a la abstinence.” (Monique Puig-Antich) “We gave three to four
months advance notice. DPH was in disbelief because it was unheard of,
but it was the agency’s saving grace.” (Juan Vega)
Things were bound to get worse before they got better. “We ran out
of cash. We hit the brick wall and couldn’t make payroll.” (Juan Vega) In
March 2004, Juan and the chief financial officer looked down the road and
saw the agency was heading toward a $100,000 deficit. Something had
to be done. They had gambled and, without some kind of bailout, stood
to have the agency scuttled. They went to their local foundation funders
with a plan for turning the agency around, and with $25,000 in pledges
from local businesspeople, laid their cards on the table: It was a choice of
either amputating the state-funded program or hemorrhaging out of existence. “We developed a plan, a test of our thinking on how we would turn
the agency around, where we saw the funding gap, the downfall, detailed
financials, and when we expected the worst part to come. We laid it out
in front.” (Juan Vega) The foundations came through. “Centro developed a
media campaign, El Mundo had articles, Univision responded, there was
a poverty march dedicated to Centro. We asked all the staff to take a pay
reduction and closed the agency on Fridays, and the staff cooperated and
went a week without pay and the majority stayed put. For three months
we instituted a four day work week.” (Juan Vega)
In a focus group I conducted with four representatives of some of
Centro’s foundation funders, two of whom reminisced about that episode,
I was told that at that juncture the local funding foundations, some of
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whom created Centro, took a close look at the agency and its chief executive officer in order to decide upon the soundness of leadership and
the agency’s economic and administrative viability. As one said, the circumstances “required a full-fledged review. Where is Centro situated as a
community-based organization? It’s an anchor organization, and what I
got was that Juan was solid and forthright [by] leveling with us. We met
with some of his board members and got a snapshot of their level of confidence—that they were going to stick with it.” Another remarked, “We
were in constant contact with them and they had support from the community. They were in serious trouble and they stuck with what they were
trying to do.” (Focus group interview, December 10, 2008) In referring to
it as an anchor organization, the foundations were alluding to Centro’s
foothold in the community and the stability it contributed to the nonprofit service provider’s role in giving stable support to the city’s needy
population. The funders clearly were confident that this decision, while
risky, was not irresponsible or rash.
As part of the plan, Monique Antich-Puig came on that year as the
director of organizational development, a job she said she had little actual
experience with (she has a master’s in educational policy and originally
taught English as a Second Language), but which she learned by doing:
“I had no development experience at all. I had some early successes that
kept me here. I started by writing some grants that came in a couple of
months. A few of the first ones I sent out came in with checks.” Both she
and the organization had survived and proven themselves in trials by fire.
Next she tried her hand at planning a “gala” fundraiser that raised $50,000
and became an annual event that most recently more than doubled the
initial figure. More than a fundraiser, she was hired as a planner who could
visualize the larger picture in terms of understanding and evaluating the
agency’s internal structure, its complement of programs, and its position
and role in the community as a service provider.
At present, along with its chief financial officer and director of organizational development, two operations directors have been added,
constituting an administrative layer beneath the executive director—the
deputy directors—with a bevy of program directors beneath them. Thus
it is developing an organizational line or administrative hierarchy. While
this appears to enhance organizational efficiency, it also is an embryonic
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bureaucracy, with buffers between an administrative pinnacle, and service providers and clients, creating insularity and the potential for problems of communication between frontline staff and administrators, and
the executive. As described in the epigraph, the new added level of administration has buffered relationships and communication with the executive director. Flora Vasquez told me,
The change that I see lately…is that before the executive director used to be a little bit more involved in the development of
the programs and used to be more aware of what was happening with each and every program….He decided to add a new
level of administration (Flora Vasquez, Interview, June 10, 2009).
She says that the absence of that communication has resulted in her
feeling like she’s at sea when it comes to getting feedback and direction:
“I don’t feel that I get enough supervision, to tell you the truth, or enough
support.” Thus, with the absence of supervision and support there is a
resulting anomie, punctuated by the necessity to quell crises stemming
from the lack of communication and contact between levels:
I feel that even though I am a program director I’m kind of
hanging by myself….I don’t know if it’s that ____ [her supervisor] has more people to supervise or that his attention is
somewhere else. I feel that my program stays…and it goes because I think that they have confidence in me, that they trust
me and everything but I’m not connected to nobody....I love
Centro as an agency but sometimes I wonder. People tend to
act only when there are fires. They like to put fires out but they
don’t like to be involved much in anything.
An individual teaching ESL classes had an interesting and candid
take on the organization members’ understanding of its clients that
speaks to the administrative, ethnic, and status forms of social distance
between Centro’s administrators and clients: “We sometimes think we
know our clients better than we do.…[W]e don’t always necessarily have
a clear idea of the needs of our clients or the needs of Chelsea. We think
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we do, but we don’t know for sure.” When I remarked that a lot of Centro’s
staff and its administrative leadership, including Juan Vega, is Latino, and
asked if this went for them and him as well, she replied, “I think yes, if
somebody comes in and is going to do what he has done for himself, it
is very different than some of our clientele….Latinos as a whole are not
pigeon-holed as one particular group. There’s [sic] a lot of people from different countries.” When I raised Juan Vega being Puerto Rican, and thus
a part of the old Latino mainstay of the city, and that not all Latinos in
Chelsea are the same, she immediately added, “versus undocumented
El Salvadorans who have come from nothing, who have never been to
school. Our clientele at times are a little bit different….We have a lot of
El Salvadorans, a lot of undocumented learners here who don’t have the
resources and the status.” (Linda Ridgeway, Interview, June 30, 2009) She
added that “the people at the top are not a closed door,” albeit the administration has to think about the bottom line and that, nonetheless, many
things are happening to bridge the social gaps in the population.
In addition, speaking about Centro’s program roster, this staff member insightfully remarked that “another interesting thing about our clientele in terms of job placement is, that most clients will come and say, ‘I’m
taking English to get a better job,’ but they don’t necessarily want someone to tell them what that job is. They have in their head already what
they want to do.” She noted that Centro has gotten out of the business
of workforce placement, observing that much government employment
placement money is earmarked for types of jobs their clients may not
want to do, so offering that service would be disrespectful of their clients’
own career aims. Thus, “they may be a busboy but they want to be a line
order chef….Our learners don’t necessarily think there’s anything wrong
with their job.” In this respect, by not lapsing into the official ethnocentric
lexicon of workforce development the agency remains in tune with its
clientele.
With a recent merger with an organization of comparable size, the
tendency toward bureaucratization and communicative buffering is likely to intensify, for as Juan Vega said in response to my question concerning
the danger of Centro becoming too businesslike, “Our danger is that we
won’t become businesslike enough!” (December 4, 2008)
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Professionalism and the Work Ethic
Along with a businesslike structure comes a work ethic that fits well
with it. While this is not explicitly stated as part of the organizational mission, it revealed itself in interviews with several staff, and certainly serves
as a component of what might be called an ethic of immigrant incorporation—that is, a kind of acculturative mechanism, shaping relationships
with Centro’s clients and thereby assisting them to adapt to the new social
world many have entered. For the employees, key aspects of the work ethic
aid them in interpreting clients’ attitudes as they respond to an unfamiliar
and occasionally disagreeable reception encountered in the classroom and
the world outside. The work ethic is a cultural complex of ideas and values
stressing the worth of pursuing a career, deferring gratification of present
desires, and investing sustained effort to do so. It is nothing less than the
secularized variant of the Protestant Ethic described by Max Weber more
than a century ago. (Weber, 1958)
In an interview with Julio Flores, a supervisor, he emphasized how the
people now working at Centro are more professional due to the standards
and salary levels established in the watershed period described above:
When the three of them [the chief financial officer, deputy director of
programs, and Juan Vega] came here they were the ones who really started
working hard on the structure, on how people come dressing to work, the
attitude at the front desk, with the clients, with the students. You know,
those types of professional services; and with time, you know, to be able to
get more money to be able to raise [the] salary range, we were able to bring
more professional people into Centro (Interview, August 26, 2009).
Clearly, in addition to denoting the skills qualifying one for the job,
professionalism has an ideological component connoting impression management (e.g., dress), or one’s composure and attitude toward one’s work.
Thus, as part and parcel of developing a nascent bureaucracy, the watershed period also was responsible for instilling a sensibility in the organization. This sensibility’s ideological dimension includes as well a propensity
for Centro staff both to exhibit and to inculcate attitudes toward work and
responsibility in their clients and students, for this also meets the quality
standards of the agents who fund the programs they work in.
In this regard, Julio Flores went on to compliment an HIV testing and
case-management specialist, Felipe: “You see Felipe is a specialist in what
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he does. I mean Felipe can get through four hundred HIV tests in a year
with a 95 percent return rate.” He added that “it doesn’t matter how many
HIV tests we do. Our contract [with the Department of Public Health]
requires us to have an 85% return rate.” (Interview, August 26, 2009) More
to the point, if staff members are evaluated on results, how does Felipe
achieve such superlative numbers exceeding the evaluation standard of
the program? It is through his dedication and experience, which enable
him to motivate clients who come to the agency for testing to return to
receive test results. But because Felipe is so effective, his workload has
become so heavy that, according to discussions I have had with him, he
has been prompted to vigorously support the agency hiring an additional
tester and case manager, whom he is currently training. By the same token, he lobbied against his immediate supervisor hiring an acquaintance
with fewer qualifications, thereby risking some on-the-job dissonance for
himself. Thus, professionalism can be a double-edged sword.
When it comes to handling clients, several interviewed staff instructors of ESL and computer courses intimated that, having become accustomed to free educational and other services, a work ethic was wanting
among their student clients. Others, in discussing their students’ slow
progress and/or lack of literacy, remarked on their ignorance of U.S. history and holidays. Some employees remarked on a kind of “freeloading”
syndrome among their immigrant clients. A technical education supervisor and teacher, Aristide Colon, directly connected the issue of free services with his students’ lack of progress, suggesting that the agency may
be coddling its clients:
We are trying to get people out of the custom of getting everything for free….I work with clients that are very independent
but I work with a lot of newcomers in the U.S. that once they
see all the help they can get—free healthcare, housing, food,
bilingual services—after a while they don’t want to move on
or up in level. A lot of clients go to Bunker Hill [Community
College] after us, and after they get to Bunker Hill they want to
come back….They can’t but we hear that at the beginning, and
they may quit Bunker Hill and fail. I sometimes wonder if we
are babysitting too much our students and clients (Interview,
July 8, 2009).
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This teacher came from South America to Chelsea as a child and
participated throughout his teenage years in a number of Centro’s programs, eventually going on to Bunker Hill Community College and from
there to complete a college degree in computer science. He likened Centro
to a family and has returned as a dedicated teacher and program director.
It is interesting that he sees getting services for free as a “custom,” if not
carried by clients from their home countries, perhaps one learned here
as a kind of incorporative disability or syndrome fostered by their experiences with service agencies. In addition, he ironically remarked on the
facility with which some of his students would enunciate the importance
of getting their education for free, while driving nice cars and sporting
fancy cellular phones. Similarly, a supervisor, Silvia Negrón, added that
it is important to “quite frankly stop the ‘Gimme everything for free attitude,’” noting that “I’ve been accused of sounding like a Republican when
I say that, but I really believe we need to help people help themselves.”
(Interview, August 20, 2009)
Some staff in their narratives connect clients’ experiences with free
classes with their low levels of literacy, their inability to progress, and their
deficiency of knowledge of United States history, as is the case in the following interview excerpt from an ESL teacher initially juxtaposing her
students’ slow progress with Centro’s free classes and their personal problems, and then their provincialism regarding the world outside of Chelsea
and their ignorance of U.S. cultural conventions.
When I first came, even though I was familiar with the kind
of students that would be here, I was still pretty surprised by
them. [Ques.: “How come?”] I know that many of our students
have been at Centro for a long time because we have free classes and we don’t move people out as quickly due to a lot of personal factors that the students have which inhibit them from
studying and improving, but I was a little surprised at their
level of education and English considering we have a number
of students who’ve lived in Chelsea the majority of their life. I
mean Chelsea is great. You don’t have to speak English if you
don’t want to. You can get any services you need in Spanish,
but I know that most all my students work outside of Chelsea
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with other immigrants. I’m talking about literacy and knowledge of the world outside of this community. [Ques.: What surprised you, lack of understanding and knowledge of the outside world?] Knowledge of history and events, especially U.S.
history and events. You know if you have lived here a long time
we celebrate a lot of holidays and make that pretty known to
people. (Eva Simmons, Interview, July 6, 2009)
She subsequently added that her pedagogy entailed assisting students to connect classroom processes and reading to their lives: “The students need to make more of a connection on how this is going to help
improve their life.” She cited Jim Cummins’s writing on language learning
and identity (e.g., Cummins, 1994) and sincerely tried to bridge the cultural gaps between her students and her professional expectations.
In the above narrative witness this instructor’s attempt to reconcile the cultural differences between her and her students and her own
dismay at their lack of familiarity with, and perhaps even interest in, her
nation’s history and culture. Some teachers have an easier time with this
than others, as in the case of another ESL instructor who grew up in Chelsea and used his own working-class immigrant family background as a
way to bridge the ethnic difference between him and his students and to
connect with them. “I should be the last person to tell people they’re not
welcome.” (Philip David, Interview, July 14, 2009)
The above material evinces the clear dedication of staff to their
educational mission. On the whole they manifest tremendous empathy
with their students, and their enunciation of the Protestant Ethic is sympathetically voiced with the aim of enabling their clients and students
to make it in an increasingly demanding environment of narrowing employment opportunities that increasingly require specialized training.
Many remark on how, on the other hand, students do catch on and apply
themselves, matching their students’ diligence with a dialogic pedagogy,
prompting them to learn through making connections between the subject matter and their lives. Seeing Chelsea as a kind of supportive environment with its relative ease in securing services and with some students’
relaxed sense of the necessity to learn English, the staff ’s voicing of the
work ethic is done good-naturedly in the spirit of helping them. Thus it
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reflects, in part, the teachers’ own experiences in preparing themselves
professionally. By the same token, many of the ESL teachers are part-time
workers piecing together a living with several jobs, thus facing the same
conditions as their underemployed students. One staff member agreed
with this analogy and added that this is why she has to come to class wellprepared, since some students may have taken time off from work to attend and she does to want to waste their time. Likewise, in the fee-based
programs students want to make progress and get their money’s worth.
(Jill Hembro, Interview, July 15, 2009)
The Political Risks
As suggested by Gladys Vega’s statement in the epigraph, community organizing is a principal method of information gathering as well as
implementing the Collaborative’s action strategy. Growing out of an organization created in 1988 by the same parties involved in the creation
of Centro, the Collaborative originally was an association of executive
directors of direct service-providing agencies (i.e., Chelsea Human Services Collaborative). Gladys Vega began work there as a receptionist and
simultaneously worked in the community to organize Latino leaders to
develop a voice to enunciate their own needs. As she put it, “White people
were always making the decisions, and with the existing nonprofits, went
and gave the community what they thought was needed.” (Gladys Vega,
Interview, July 28, 2009) In 2006 she became the Collaborative’s executive director. By using a community organizing method of educating its
constituents and coupling this method to a direct-action approach to redressing grievances, rectifying injustices, and pressing for social change,
the Collaborative, in effect, uses social conflict in a constructive manner,
and does so essentially as a two-layered “horizontal” organization whose
executives bow to the decisions arrived at by its constituent group members and staff through a democratic process of consensus building.
Social action, even as it creates controversy and strong criticism,
gets results and enhances its legitimacy among and for groups that prevailing social forces otherwise tend to repress and marginalize. Moreover,
in redressing grievances and forcing an unscrupulous employer who
might withhold wages or tips to pay their undocumented employees, in
indicting travel agents illegally pilfering immigrants’ air ticket deposits,
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and check-cashing concerns for not recording immigrants’ utility bill deposits or delivering paid-for remittances back home, in getting free legal
assistance and back pay for “lumpers” (workers who off-load trucks at
a local supermarket chain distribution center), normative precedents
are set and lessons taught for, and to, the local community (see Chelsea
Collaborative, undated). On a somewhat larger scale, the Collaborative
organized local residents, parents, students, and others, using tactics of
door-to-door recruiting, testifying at public hearings, data gathering via
participatory action research, demonstrating, and disrupting “several
high profile demonstrations by the power company” that applied to the
city and state regulatory agencies to build a 250-megawatt diesel power
plant in a Chelsea neighborhood but scuttled its planned installment (Miranda, Reynoso and Staples, undated, p. 6). While in all of these examples
local and outside interests of businesses are thwarted and offended, winning battles of social justice enhances the legitimacy of the groups engaging in them, not to mention reinforcing collective solidarity among those
who did the fighting.
When, as in the case of the power plant, larger extra-community
forces are thwarted, the publicity accompanying the struggle is used to
solidify the sentiments of the rest of the city with those neighborhood
residents on whose behalf the struggle has been waged, thus enfolding
those who struggled in the city’s social as well as its geographic boundaries. This is how incorporation at base encompasses a social phenomenon.
Having said this, however, it should be noted that its methods, or mode of
being in the community, impel the Collaborative’s membership and staff to
meticulously exercise discretion in the conduct of their and the organization’s business.
Since it is a nonprofit corporation, a “501C3,” it is legally obliged not
to engage in partisan politics. Thus, members who are individually running for or occupying public office must not engage in political activities
during work time or on the premises of the Collaborative’s office, or during the conduct of its activities and programs. In a recent interview, Elise
Antonelli, a two-thirds-time employee and ex–city official, discussed how
intertwined employment and membership is, and can become with the
different sides of a person’s life thereby integrating it:
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You cannot walk around Chelsea without them mentioning
[names three members]....You become a member, you become
part of a coalition and things like that, whether it’s the tenant’s
association, whether it’s CUDE the parent’s group, whether
it’s Green Space, whether it’s the Latino Immigrant Committee, you know, you just become involved and you want to help.
You become part of a committee, and then if you have kids
you might have an issue with the school and you might talk to
someone and become part of the parent groups, or if you have
a kid that’s the age of fourteen they’ll apply for the Summer
Youth Employment Program. It’s all entwined….It becomes almost like a family (Interview, August 25, 2009).
Employment at, and membership in, the Collaborative can become risky if one’s outside life includes holding political office or being
involved in partisan activity. In our discussion Elise Antonelli mentioned
five names of Collaborative board members who are now or recently have
been City Council members. As a result, employees, members, and the
Collaborative occasionally walk a thin line in terms of their interests and
roles, as Elise Antonelli suggests, using herself as an example. “I work here
from eight to three. I work for the Collaborative, I get paid by the Collaborative, but from 3:30 to whatever is my time. If I want to go and hold
signs for ____ , I can do that, but people don’t see that.” Thus, in referring
to a member who is on the City Council:
It’s very tricky….I think it gets more tricky for _____ [an employee], because even though she’s on the City Council she still
fights for her environmental justice issues, and that’s one hat
that she wears. You have to be very careful because you don’t
want people to come out and to point fingers saying, “Oh, it’s
’cause she works for the Collaborative, and things have come
out that hurt us.”
She says, “and that’s where we all have to be very careful. On Election
Day, we should all take it off. That’s our personal time.” Here one’s simultaneous outside political involvement and Collaborative employment can
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be seen by both the public and the law as a conflict of interest because
the Collaborative is a nonprofit, and even more significantly, as Antonelli
states, because of public opinion, which in the compactness and density
of Chelsea often courses through interpersonal contacts and relations.
Moreover, the risk of negative public opinion is a double-edged sword because it can alienate politicians connected with state funding agencies.
As she puts it:
We have to be very careful with our funders, especially when
one of our projects is getting the vote out, the Voter Initiative,
you know, registering people. [Interviewer: “Things have come
out that, do what, get you in trouble with funders?”] Get us in
trouble with funders in the sense that…the negative press. A
politician doesn’t want, you know, to fund a group that, you
know, people are against them.
The Collaborative’s activities here get very dicey, especially the Voter
Initiative, as Antonelli suggests, because the organization is funded to engage the political process, not only in registering voters but in informing
voters of their rights, which is, as she puts it, “part of educating people,
you know showing them, ‘These are your rights.’ If there’s an issue at the
poll, ‘These are your rights. They should not turn you away.’ I’m telling you,
people have learned to speak up and say, ‘No, I know I can vote here.’…
Some of the poll workers can be nasty!” Such are the risks of challenging
prejudices and threatening interests.
Finally, the only drawback to the Collaborative’s organizational format stems from the very features that comprise its virtues: its lack of an
authority-laden hierarchy and the relative autonomy of its members, staff,
and groups that result in actions taken that are sometimes not clearly
communicated to everyone. While this was not a strong complaint
among those I interviewed, some have noted it in passing, mentioning
it in conjunction with the need for more advanced program planning, or
have simply remarked that they were not informed in this or that case
about paperwork that had been completed. On the other hand, many
people that I interviewed proudly stated that a key admirable feature
of the Collaborative is its capacity to act immediately on an issue when
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needed. Thus Alex Soto, whose work with the Collaborative I describe
below, noted that after a 2007 raid by the Immigration and Customs Enforcement in New Bedford, Massachusetts, resulting in the flash deportation of a large number of Maya K’iche undocumented workers, leaving
many of their children deserted, the Collaborative responded with aid immediately and in two days came up with an emergency plan for dealing
with such an eventuality in Chelsea. Perhaps piecemeal communication
is a small price to pay for the capacity to respond in a spontaneous and
effective manner.
A Case of Cross-Community Collaboration
While the closeness of the Collaborative members’ and memberemployee relationships can be risky for funding and public opinion, the
other side of this issue is its evident virtue, given that the closeness of
the Collaborative staff and membership to the community is definitely
a product of the way it engages the community and the manner it understands its mission as a community-building one. There is little doubt
that the integrality of Latino and other immigrants to its mission of social
justice speaks to its effectiveness as a social incorporator of immigrants.
After all, isn’t enabling immigrants to resist exploitation and thereby gain
materially tantamount to rendering a service that enhances participation or incorporation in society? Moreover, the solidarity fostered by the
Collaborative’s modus operandi is an asset and is not based on excluding
others. In the case that follows, we learn about partnering between the
Collaborative and an organization in Boston. It is an object lesson in how
partnering stems from the Collaborative’s modus operandi.
Alex Soto is a community organizer for a Boston-based environmental justice organization, Alternatives for Community Development (ACE),
and a group within it, the T Riders, created in 1999, that focuses on public transportation equity in the city and surrounding area. The group was
started by ACE to deal with the high asthma rates in Roxbury, a predominantly African American community. ACE mapped the hazards in the
area, consisting of much truck traffic, an MBTA bus terminal and garage
(the Bartley yard) that kept 100 buses constantly running, a trash-transfer
site for a company routing refuse to other parts of the state, the Boston
Public Schools garage, and a private bus depot. The group started the
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Clean Buses for Boston campaign, targeting the MBTA, and soon learned
at community meetings that, in addition to the environmental hazards,
the public transportation service in the area was poor. The completion
of the Big Dig made clear it directly benefited only motorists, and the
Conservation Law Foundation sued to compel the state to provide better
public transport. This action succeeded in getting the state to fund several
urban bus lines and a subway extension, and make several commitments
to new MBTA projects.
In 2000 and 2003, transit fares were increased. “During this time
somebody in the Chelsea Collaborative…heard about the T Riders union,
and he came to one of the meetings and he said, ‘Listen, you know, like
we live in Chelsea, we’re facing the same problems that you guys are facing here in Roxbury: buses are late and dirty, weekend service is really
poor, we can’t get where we want to go on weekdays. We want to create a committee over there.’ So ACE decided to provide the resources to
help this group to address some of the issues that Chelsea was facing at
that time.” (Alex Soto, Interview, July 23, 2009) Through the Collaborative’s
Green Space program ACE was able to link the environmental justice
issue and Chelsea’s transportation issues. In 2005 or 2006 Soto came to
Chelsea, when the program was already established, and met members
of the Collaborative: “I came on board to supply support for what [the
leader-organizer] was trying to do with transit justice in the area.” ACE
also supplied legal support for the aforementioned campaign against the
power plant in Chelsea.
As an outsider, Soto sees the Collaborative as “one of the organizations that’s truly open to the community. We have many nonprofit organizations in the area—Chelsea, East Boston—and [in contrast to] the usual
9 to 5 open business hours, the Collaborative is trying to go beyond that.
It’s more a human face….That for me is something very positive I would
like to see in other organizations.” He related that the previous evening
ACE had a once-a-year Game Night in the Collaborative’s offices for the
T Riders Union members. “We were playing karaoke with the members,
you know dominoes, all of those kinds of things, and the organization was
comfortable enough to give us the key, and say to us, ‘Hey guys make sure
everything is closed.’ I don’t know, I do not know any other organization
that is comfortable to do that, like for anyone that is not part of the staff.”
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(Alex Soto, Interview, July 23, 2009) He went on to say that he and other
ACE members participate in the Collaborative’s activities, such as demonstrations in front of the aforementioned check-cashing establishment,
its march to observe International Workers’ Day on May 1, and the Chelsea River Revel, an annual event organized by the Collaborative’s Green
Space committee on the bridge connecting Chelsea and East Boston.
What is unique is the trust each organization has extended to the
other, which has led to almost an immediate sharing of resources. This
trust appears to be based on the felt common experiences of both memberships. Also what is interesting is the cross-ethnic and -racial nature of
their cooperation. Alex Soto characterized the potential relations of the
two organizations’ African American and Latino constituencies:
Here in Roxbury and Dorchester I can say pretty much that
ninety percent are African American. One of the reasons
I think ACE decides to bring a Latino [i.e., himself] into the
staff…was with the idea to create this connection….I think me
being the person that is in contact with Chelsea… usually every time we have a meeting over there I try to bring somebody
from Roxbury or Dorchester that is African American….[Regarding] this perception that “we’re so different, you know like,
that you guys have your own way to address issues…and we
have our own way,”…at the end of the day, you know, there is
so much similarity in these two communities that sometimes
the society…tries to divide the communities. (Interview, Alex
Soto, July 23, 2009)
Alex’s statement underscores the possible motives for ACE having
hired him, a Latino, to organize black people around transportation issues, and then demonstrates the advantage for having done so as represented by the potency of the cross-racial and -ethnic coalition he helped
create in order to overcome the fictions used to divide Latinos and blacks.
In a sense, the proof of coalescing is in the pudding, for the two organizations took to each other on the basis of common need and immediately
pooled their resources.
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Betwixt and Between Service and Advocacy
While common sense dichotomizes service and activism/advocacy, the literature on immigrant-based nonprofits indicates that the line
between them cannot be definitively drawn and that some communitybased organizations do both. So, while Centro does seem to fit the mold
of an exclusively service-offering nonprofit, and the activist Collaborative engages in strategies of community change, we learn that the former engages in some advocacy and the latter also provides services. In
this regard, Els de Graauw, a political scientist at City University of New
York, Baruch College, in summarizing some of her findings on forty-five
nonprofits catering to immigrants in San Francisco, corrects mistaken
conceptions rigidly dichotomizing service and advocacy in such organizations:
It would be a mistake to characterize them solely as service
providers. They are increasingly combining service provision
with advocacy campaigns and political activism….With their
service provision activities, nonprofits fight the symptoms of
a limited public service system. With their advocacy activities,
they fight the root causes of the injustices immigrants experience in American society. (2008, pp. 326, 328)
We can bypass the simplistic service-advocacy dichotomy if we
frame the issue in terms of the quid pro quos exchanged between the organizations and their clients and members. Some literature on immigrant
nonprofits focuses on the extent and kind of “reciprocity” that the organization expects, demands, or persuades clients and members to return.
In other words, the organization “communicates to the local resident that
some form of return [such as participation in events] to the organization
is expected from him or her” in exchange for services rendered. (Marwell,
2004, p. 272; de Graauw, p. 330) With respect to the connection between
reciprocity and incorporation, Columbia University sociologist Nicole P.
Marwell tells us that sociopolitical participation consists of communitybuilding and organizational strengthening:
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When CBOs engage in reciprocal service provision…they
move from only providing services to also doing community
building work. In this transition there is a qualitative shift in
the relationships between CBOs and their clients. CBOs that
do community building create stronger relationships with
their clients, thereby maintaining client identification with
the CBOs, their community programmatic missions, and their
staffs. (2004, p. 275)
In the case of the community-organizing Collaborative, such reciprocity actually is its mainstay, although it is not regarded as service returned to the organization but as participation in programs of community change and betterment. Moreover, Gladys Vega’s exhortation to go
to the street is an organizing principle used to gather information about
the immigrant communities’ needs, concerns, and problems that is directly fed into the Collaborative’s ever-changing recruitment and action
agendas and strategies to transform the circumstances of immigrants in
Chelsea, and thereby socially incorporate them. In other words, after receiving help, the Collaborative’s clients often are recruited into participating in programs targeting social change. While Centro does not require
reciprocity from its clients but does do so from its employees, I have heard
statements rhetorically exhorting clients to exercise more responsibility
to and for the community, as when a supervisor plaintively told me, “We
need to do a better job of taking people from where they are and helping,
pushing them to take more responsibility for the community.” (Silvia Negrón, Interview, August 20, 2009) In addition, while Centro does not have
a formal requirement, it does expect a modicum of employee participation
in off-hours advocacy and job-connected activities.
Because Centro offers fee-driven as well as free services, expectations for client reciprocity are likely to remain somewhat muted, with
moral suasion instead exercised on clients, and is channeled pedagogically into the educational and quasi-educational context of its programs.
On the other hand, for employees, as one supervisor, Julio Flores, put it,
“We encourage staff, clients, and students to attend lobbying days. There’s
Cinco de Mayo, [and] lobbying days at the State House for immigration
reform. We go to those.” (Julio Flores, Interview, August 26, 2009) More102

over, this interviewee, underscoring the expectations and formal means
of compensation for employees’ participation in extracurricular events,
informed me:
When people are hired we talk about these activities, and at
staff meetings. Everyone does participate. If someone says,
“That’s not part of my job description,” you can do that but
you’ll know it’s not right to do that. If you talk to your immediate supervisor, we have a comp time policy. We have many
activities on a Saturday or Sunday and you get paid for that.
(Julio Flores, Interview, August 26, 2009)
When I questioned him about whether some of these activities were
actually work-related tasks, such as handing out flyers advertising Centro
services, I was told they were. Thus, in the minds of some Centro employees, outside advocacy and work-related participation seem to form
a seamless web. It is clear that reciprocity as I have defined it here, as the
obligation to repay service (or paid work) with voluntary service to the
organization, applies almost exclusively to Centro’s employees and not to
its clients.
So what is to be concluded about the two organizations’ roles in
incorporating immigrants—that is, facilitating their social, economic,
and political participation, in Chelsea? Centro accomplishes immigrant
incorporation through fee-driven or free services provided by an increasingly professional staff. The clear division between Centro’s staff, and its
students and clients, versus the fluid, murky, and occasionally risky blurring and overlap of the boundaries between the horizontally organized
Collaborative staff, members, and civilians, and between itself and the
surrounding community, reflects on the very different organizational
structures and how these two organizations incorporate immigrants into
the surrounding society. The more vertical, verging on bureaucratic, organizational structure of Centro developed out of a calculated attempt to
make itself financially more viable and more professional (i.e., to enhance
the specialized qualifications of its personnel). In accomplishing this aim,
Centro in a sense pays the piper because it risks alienating its employees
and developing anomie, or a sense of a loss of purpose among them.
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The Collaborative accomplishes incorporation through its method
of community organizing, which, although providing services to wouldbe and actual members, does so for the purpose of recruiting them to
participate in a widening circle of participation in social change. Thus,
in Centro’s case, the line dividing incorporator and incorporatee is more
clearly drawn, whereas for the Collaborative the encompassing aims of
participation in social action and the blurring or overlap of the roles of
staff, members, and citizens obviates the distinction and renders these
participants agents of their own incorporation. In this sense, incorporation proceeds through utilization of a more horizontal organizational
format based on a consensual teamwork model fostering individual and
collective self-reliance. The price paid here, as I have described it, consists
of the stresses and strains caused by its very virtues—that is, the internal
stress stemming from the necessity of keeping its organizational and role
definitional books straight, and externally, in carefully managing its organizational impressions in the face of local public opinion and the perceptions of local and state politicians and funders.
In sum, what does all of this say about the value of the two organizations to their immigrant clientele? Both organizations, with the qualifications noted above, do their jobs well: the nature and extent of services offered by the Collaborative cannot—nor are they intended to—rival those
offered by Centro, and the community-organizing and social action agenda (and the benefits therein) of the Collaborative fall far outside Centro’s
bailiwick. In the final analysis, the two organizations functionally complement each other in this small city where people and problems snug up
against each other in comfortable and uncomfortable ways. Ironically,
the key problems that their structures and processes cause boil down to
those of communication. One then wonders if the remedy to their organizational stumbling blocks might be found, for example, in Centro adopting more of a team approach to counteract the anomie and alienation
caused by piling on more administrative strata; and for the Collaborative
to put in place a system of communicative centralization in place of the
chaotic and unsystematic means of communication currently in place.
The trick, I suppose, would lie in the capacity of each to put a brake on
these solutions lest they, like the sorcerer’s apprentice, become runaway
remedies engendering a whole new set of problems and dilemmas.
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